The government has said it could pursue bilateral agreements with some member states if it fails to reach EU-wide agreements. However, some experts have indicated that bilateral agreements could be limited by the EU`s exclusive competences. It proposed a more limited agreement to allow the transfer of unaccompanied children from asylum seekers to family members in the UK/EU. But campaigners say the proposals are insufficient and that it seems unlikely to reach an agreement before the end of the transition period. What about the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice before the end of the transition? This applies to the interpretation of EU law maintained, unless the government decides that this is not the case. The 2020 Act contains controversial provisions that allow the government to adopt rules requiring the courts to how and when to apply current EU jurisprudence. It remains to be seen how often this “broad and constitutionally significant” power will be exercised and what areas of the law will be targeted by the government. This can create confusion. If no future relationship agreement were reached by 31 December 2020, it would not be the same as leaving the EU without the withdrawal agreement, particularly with regard to the rights of EU citizens in the UK. It was reported that the EU had rejected the agreements proposed by the United Kingdom because they were not within the framework of their negotiating mandate. Neither the political declaration between the UK and the EU nor the draft EU text for a new partnership agreement with the UK explicitly identifies asylum, unaccompanied children or readmissions as areas for future agreements or cooperations.
Recent government statements have expressed confidence that the ability to negotiate new return agreements will strengthen the UK`s ability to return asylum seekers to other European countries, although some outside commentators have a different view. So why do we continue with the same (old) guidelines? If a policy is maintained when it does not meet its most basic objectives, it is because the real objectives are elsewhere. This is called a “symbolic policy” in political science. The current situation is paradigmatic. Although it is known that it is not possible to deal with the current refugee crisis without a genuine common European policy, the focus is on a policy that is clearly ineffective but which keeps national prerogatives intact. Although we know that evictions are never the solution, the need for repatriation is always to be “hard” and thus to appease a part of the electorate. Nevertheless, the insistence on a policy that does not work comes at a high price: on the one hand, Europe does not fulfil its most fundamental obligations (not only moral, but also legal) towards asylum seekers and, on the other hand, by its lack of response, Europe justifies and reinforces the most ultranationalist and xenophobic attitudes. Dublin does not seek to distribute the responsibility of refugees equitably between the different Member States, but to create the State which is responsible for the rapid processing of each application, on the basis of certain criteria already defined. One of the main objectives is to prevent a person seeking asylum in the country of his choice (“asylum shopping”) from being present in Europe, without any country taking responsibility for the examination of his claim (“orbiting”).